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Abstract. When surfing the Internet, individuals leak personal and corporate in-
formation to third parties whose (legitimate or not) businesses revolve around the
value of collected data. The implications are serious, from a person unwillingly
exposing private information to an unknown third party, to a company unable to
manage the flow of its information to the outside world. The point is that indi-
viduals and companies are more and more kept out of the loop when it comes to
control private data.
With the goal of empowering informed choices in information leakage through
the Internet, we propose CROWDSURF, a system for comprehensive and collab-
orative auditing of data that flows to Internet services. Similarly to open-source
efforts, we enable users to contribute in building awareness and control over pri-
vacy and communication vulnerabilities. CROWDSURF provides the core infras-
tructure and algorithms to let individuals and enterprises regain control on the
information exposed on the web.
We advocate CROWDSURF as a data processing layer positioned right below
HTTP in the host protocol stack. This enables the inspection of clear-text data
even when HTTPS is deployed and the application of processing rules that are
customizable to fit any need. Preliminary results obtained executing a prototype
implementation on ISP traffic traces demonstrate the feasibility of CROWDSURF.
1 Introduction
Users increasingly rely on Internet services, looking for news and products, accessing
social networks, organizing their life, etc. There are companies that base their business
on the collection of personal information implicitly or explicitly embedded in the above
users’ activities. This results in leakage of information that users and companies prefer
to keep private, in people being exposed to dubious third-party services, as well as in
web companies (sometimes illegitimately) tracking their users. This phenomenon is
ubiquitous, with even the major players taking part in it [1,2,10].
Hence, users’ concerns about privacy and information leakage largely increased,
motivated also by recently exposed government surveillance programs. However, no
means exist to control which data is handed to the web.
To this end, a common misconception is that encryption would solve the problem.
Accordingly, HTTPS usage increased by 100% each year, reaching about 42% of web
⋆ This work was conducted under the Narus Fellow Research Program.
2 Hassan Metwalley et al.
flows in June 2014 [11]. In reality, the effects are quite different and rather exacerbate
the problem. Firstly, encryption increases the value of data. Specifically, web services
that deploy encryption establish a monopoly on information by precluding any other
parties from deploying it, thus gaining a huge advantage in today’s Internet where many
businesses revolve around user information. Secondly, when HTTPS is deployed, users
have no chance to rely on third parties to check and possibly choose which (personal)
information they are sharing.
In this scenario, we advocate the need of a communication model where users are
explicitly offered the freedom to i) understand which services get their data, and ii) gov-
ern which information they are asked to exchange. We envision a holistic and flexible
solution to verify and control the information which is exchanged on the Internet, when
using a web browser or running a smartphone app, whether connected to the corporate
network or to a public WiFi hotspot.
CROWDSURF, presented in this paper, provides a framework for such a solution.
It is designed as an open service to which anyone can easily contribute. A part of
CROWDSURF resides on client devices to both provide visibility on traffic and possibly
act upon it (e.g., by modifying or blocking information). We conceived CROWDSURF
as a new layer that sits right between the application and the protocol stack, where
information has not yet been encrypted. CROWDSURF targets web surfing, and thus
HTTP, the new “narrow waist of the Internet” [13]. This empowers the protection of
the user’s data and optional contributions to the system by users themselves. Anyone
contributes according to a personal level of expertise or convenience, from teams of se-
curity researchers who can collaboratively measure intricate signs of behind-the-scenes
communications between the service providers, to novice users who can simply offer
anonymized samples of their traffic or vote on the legitimacy of data leaving their de-
vices.
Another part of CROWDSURF resides on open cloud servers performing intensive
processing tasks over massive datasets obtained through the contribution of volunteers.
Specifically, the cloud component runs algorithms that clean and rank users’ voting,
index voluntarily submitted traffic, and attempts to discover unknown types of infor-
mation leakage. All of the data gathered and processed enables the cloud CROWDSURF
component to compute pieces of advice about the trustfulness of web services. This
advice is shared with all the resident components that can leverage it to support users
in taking informed decisions. Users can create rules based on the received advice to
enable fine grained control on the information flow. For instance, users can choose to
block undesired services, or filter private information, or explicitly embrace third-party
services.
The technology offered by CROWDSURF is essential not only for individual users,
but also for companies with the need to control the information entering and leaving
the corporate network. Currently, companies are forced to trust the devices connected
to the network and have hard time verifying the information they exchange. The so
called “BYOD” (Bring Your Own Device) phenomenon and the reduced efficacy of
traditional approaches based on firewalls and IDS’s (mined by encryption [11]) further
exacerbate the problem. In the corporate scenario, the open cloud service is replaced
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by a private component that, through the resident components, can impose filters to any
device connected to the corporate network.
At last, CROWDSURF allows third-parties to offer novel services, possibly comple-
menting current client-server-based ones. For instance, CROWDSURF could be used to
enable a user to voluntarily use an accelerating proxy offered by an ISP only for specific
types of traffic (e.g., when watching videos, but not when accessing her bank account).
CROWDSURF would dynamically forward traffic to the proxy or directly to the final
destination depending on a set of rules provided by the user or by a third party and
relying on advice obtained by the system. CROWDSURF could even be instrumental in
enabling users to monetize on their personal information, should they decide for it, as
proposed in [14].
2 CROWDSURF Description
We envision a crowd-sourced system in which users can voluntarily opt-to collaborate
by providing explicit (e.g., their opinion) and implicit (e.g., traffic samples) information
on the web services they use. In return they obtain information about web services. A
collector – running in the cloud – collects information provided by the users, and it
feeds an automatic data analyzer, which runs data mining algorithms to produce ad-
vices. An advice contains indications about trustfulness of web services. For instance,
the data analyzer can flag services collecting/leaking users’ personal information, or
services that children should not access, or services known to host malicious software.
A federated group of experts, the advising community, inspects the results provided by
the data analyzer and interacts with it to generate the advices. Following a collaborative
approach similar to Wikipedia and the Electronic Frontier Foundation3 (EFF), users are
invited to increase the system’s “wisdom”. They can be active in controlling the per-
sonal information they expose to services, or in forming the advices. And then they
can voluntarily donate portions of their browsing activity, i.e., anonymized HTTP-level
traces. The advising community is supported by data mining algorithms that automati-
cally raise flags.
The Internet offers some tools to help users to avoid disclosing personal informa-
tion when browsing the web, e.g., popular browser plugins such as DoNotTrackMe4,
EFF’s Privacy Badger5, WoT6 and Ghostery7. For mobile terminals, some proposals
offer similar ideas [5,8]. Each targets some specific aspects of privacy leakage only.
Some leverage the idea of a crowd-sourced approach to inform users about website
trustfulness. More holistic technologies as TOR [7] offer protection to users identity
and from traffic inspection attacks, but they do not curb the personal information which
is exposed to servers at application layer. Similarly, companies are offering solutions to
control web browsing [3]. Yet, what they offer is unknown, and mostly un-verifiable.
CROWDSURF is all of them, and none of them. CROWDSURF’s challenge is in offering a
3 https://www.eff.org/
4 http://www.abine.com/donottrackme.html
5 https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
6 https://www.mywot.com/
7 https://www.ghostery.com/en/
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Fig. 1: CROWDSURF layer in the Internet stack and its high level structure.
unified system to overcome limitation of current systems, which often do not cooperate
and are dominated by manual decisions. We propose a flexible system that, based on
the knowledge of the crowd and supported by automated algorithms, empowers users
and companies, offering them the chance to retake the control on private data.
2.1 CROWDSURF System Design
For the design of CROWDSURF we follow a short list of simple design requirements:
1) Crowd-sourced: we want the system to engage users to improve its effectiveness.
2) Anonyminity: we want CROWDSURF to never offend users’ privacy. Hence any
contribution must be purged from any piece of personal information. 3) Automated:
the system have to automatically process users’ contributions to generate the advices.
4) Client centric: CROWDSURF must be available on any device, as the default tool
to support users’ choices. 5) Easy to use: we want CROWDSURF to be as simple and
automatic as possible to allow anyone to use it.
Given these principles, we imagine CROWDSURF cornerstone as a new layer to add
to the Internet stack. We expect users’ terminals, mobiles and personal computers alike,
to embed the CROWDSURF layer in their operating system. Fig. 1 represents the high
level architecture of the CROWDSURF layer. It sits between the HTTP and the transport
layer, where it handles HTTP traffic, before it is eventually encrypted. This choice is
motivated by the fact the today HTTP is “the” application layer [13].
Users asynchronously obtain advices from the advising community, and they are
free to decide to what level to take them into account: users are free to accept or over-
rule the notification of a potential danger. The system implements this feature through
the Advices to Rule-Sets block in Fig. 1. It enables controlling how advices are
translated in a set of rules, or rule-set. A rule consists of a regular expression and one
or more actions. For each HTTP request, the Rule Processor looks for matches and
applies the corresponding action, for instance Block, Redirect, Modify, Log&Report,
etc., with Allow being the default one. This simple pattern matching/action process has
proved very flexible and very efficient. It is at the root of successful technologies such
as the one used in firewalls, antiviruses, traffic classifiers, etc.
Given that CROWDSURF aims at supporting a crowd-sourced approach, the Log&Report
block is vital. It enables the collection of data samples before traffic is possibly en-
crypted. The layer can perform measurements at user’s will and under user’s control.
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Fig. 2: The entities participating to CROWDSURF and their deployment for different
network scenarios.
The layer temporarily stores the measurement data locally until a certain amount is
reached, at which point the layer transmits the data to the collector. Since protecting
user’s privacy is strategic for CROWDSURF, we adopt different approaches to avoid
compromising it. The anonymization block in Fig. 1 is responsible for this. First, it im-
plements sampling policies, e.g., by logging only a fraction of traffic at random. This
also reduces the amount of data to transfer. Second, it filters out any piece of personal
information. E.g., by default, all key values are replaced by random strings by using
cryptographic hash functions. Then, a pattern/action mechanism is used. As before, the
community can supply pre-defined lists of anonymization practices, which can always
be customized by the user. For instance a generic policy “remove all possible pass-
word fields” can be augmented with “never collect data when browsing my online bank
account”. Third, each user is assigned a unique random identifier, rotated periodically
(e.g., every day). Fourth, data on the collector will be stored for only the time needed
to process it (also to limit the storage at the collector). At last, since even informa-
tion available at the network layer (e.g., IP addresses) could be exploited to trace back
the identity of the user, transmission to the collector takes place through an encrypted
channel established over a randomly chosen CrowdProxy, i.e., by employing other de-
vices running the CROWDSURF layer as relays. The collector automatically provides
the identity of other CROWDSURF devices among which to randomly choose the relay.
Fig. 2 represents possible deployment scenarios. Private user A accessing the Inter-
net receives advices from the advising community (dashed black unidirectional arrows)
and possibly use them to regulate its access to web services (solid blue double-headed
arrows). If A’s preferences allow it, traffic samples are sent to the collector via a Crowd-
Proxy (dashed red arrows).
The advising community and public data analyzer may be supported by public bod-
ies or non-profit organization like EFF. However, advices could also be generated by
a third-party advisor run by an independent, third-party entity which offers custom ad-
vices to users. This opens a “market of advices”. For instance, user B opts for a service
offered by a third party advisor.
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Table 1: Rules for the (P)aranoid, (K)id and (C)orporate profiles.
Finally, as shown in the bottom half of Fig. 2, CROWDSURF can also be deployed
in a corporate scenario. In this case the corporate controller does not create advices,
but it directly imposes rule-sets (orange dotted arrows) which are installed on devices
connected to the corporate network (employee C). Indeed, we expect the employee not
to be allowed to modify the rule-sets imposed by the corporate authority. Notice also
that devices may be asked to report employees’ browsing activity on administrator’s de-
mand directly to the corporate controller, without involving other devices. The presence
of the corporate controller must be automatically identified by any device connected to
the corporate network including those BYOD. This can be achieved for instance using
DHCP extensions, or using standard DNS names that forces the CROWDSURF layer to
connect to the corporate controller. Notice that the same rule can be imposed on any
corporate-owned device even when connected from other networks.
2.2 CROWDSURF Application Examples
In the following we describe examples of CROWDSURF applications in both the public
Internet, and the corporate network. We use the same examples to run the experiments
presented in Sec. 3.1.
A summary of rules is available in Tab. 1. We define a “Paranoid Profile” that opts
for blocking all advertisement sites, to not run Javascript code, and to use private navi-
gation mode on the browser. This profile is the equivalent of running AdBlockPlus and
NoScript plugins. This user decides to not share any traffic samples with the community.
A second profile is called “Kid Profile”: the user activates parental control by in-
stalling the advices provided by the advising community. In the experiment, we simply
use the list of the Alexa top 50 “Adult Sites” augmented by other manually verified adult
sites. The user contributes also to manually signal other offending websites/objects he
gets into. Finally, he volunteers to enable logging and reporting of the three most pop-
ular online trackers (doubleclick.net, scorecardresearch.com, and yieldmanager.com).
A third profile impersonate the “Corporate Profile”: rules are imposed by the net-
work administrator, and i) do not allow employees to access Facebook (also removing
Facebook buttons from any website), ii) redirect all requests from Google search to
Bing search, iii) block the usage of adult sites, Ebay, Amazon, and YouTube, and iv) all
HTTP(S) requests exchanged with Dropbox and Twitter are reported to the corporate
collector.
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Fig. 3: Page rendering time cost for different plugin setups. Absolute numbers in left-
hand plot, relative values with respect to the Plugin-free setup in the right-hand plot.
3 Preliminary Prototype
We develop a preliminary CROWDSURF prototype in which we implement the CROWDSURF
layer as a Firefox plugin. It supports rules, and the block, redirect, log&report ac-
tions.8 The collector is a Java-based web service, which communicates with clients
using SOAP. During the registration phase, the collector provides the CROWDSURF
instance with a randomly assigned ID. The collector component receives and stores
reports generated by the various CROWDSURF plugins. The CROWDSURF plugin has
been installed successfully on both the desktop and the Android version of Firefox. In
the following we present simple experiments collected using this prototype.
8 For instance, the configurations developed for the Corporate and Kid profiles are available at
https://db.tt/yIl0LyX1.
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3.1 Processing Overhead
First, we evaluate the performance overhead a user would pay when running the CROWDSURF
plugin. Given the not-optimized implementation of the prototype, these benchmarks are
meant to show the feasibility of the approach rather than being considered as a thorough
testing. We consider the three profiles described in Sec. 2.2. For baseline, we take a
plugin-free configuration. We setup a testbed based on Selenium WebDriver9 to autom-
atize the browsing of a selected set of webpages. In particular, we consider i) the Alexa
top 10 global websites, ii) 8 news portals, and iii) 6 portals which do not include any
online tracker. We run the experiment from a standard PC and instrument the browser
to visit each website 20 times. After discarding the best and the worst samples, we mea-
sure the average time needed to render the webpage. We purge the browser cache and
cookies after each visit.
The left-hand plot in Fig. 3 reports the average rendering time for each website and
for each profile. We observe that news portals are the slowest at rendering, most of them
taking more than 8 s to fetch and render all the content they embed. Differently, other
websites show a much simpler design and their content (mostly being HTML, CSS
and Javascript files) are very fast to download. Right plot of Fig. 3 reports the relative
average rendering time of each profile with with respect to the Plugin-free configuration.
For some webpages as startpage.com and wikipedia.org, the rendering time is very short
(order of tens of ms). Thus, the relative difference among the three profiles is broadened,
but it is very small in absolute numbers. For the case of google.com, the Corporate
profile shows much better performance than the Paranoid, since in the former profile
requests are redirected to bing.com, which in our measurements is faster at rendering. In
general, the Paranoid profile is favored, as it blocks advertisement and some Javascript
content download, thus speeding up the rendering of the webpage in many cases. The
horizontal lines show the average of the relative rendering time for the three profiles.
The Paranoid is 1.07 times faster than the baseline. Corporate and Kid configurations
show slightly worse performance being 1.08 and 1.17 times slower, respectively.
In summary, results are variable, with more complicated pages that suffer some extra
computational costs incurred by CROWDSURF plugin that has to consider and check all
links. Nonetheless, being the current implementation not optimized, results hint that
clients today have enough power to easily handle the extra load generated by a possible
CROWDSURF implementation.
4 Motivations for Having CROWDSURF
To demonstrate the need of a system like CROWDSURF, we present some measure-
ment facts. We analyze a 10-day long traffic trace we obtain from a large European
ISP collected during October 2014 using Tstat [9]. To analyze both HTTP and HTTPS
communications, the dataset includes anonymized TCP logs from more than 19,000
households identified by the modem IP addresses, out of which 11,000 are active (as
those IP addresses from which we see at least one HTTPS request and 1000 TCP flows
9 http://www.seleniumhq.org
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Fig. 4: Shares of users adopting “popular” privacy-preserving extensions.
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Fig. 5: Percentage of users contacted from top third party tracking services.
in the trace). We leverage DN-Hunter, a technique that allows to annotate TCP flows
with original server hostname [6]
4.1 Pervasiveness of Tracking Services
We first observe how many of those users are running any plugin that could help cus-
tomizing their web browsing privacy. To measure this, for each plugin, we run some
active experiments to look for connections toward some update hostname. We then
count the fraction of users that contacted such service for updates, and report the results
in Fig. 4. The numbers are puzzling: only 3.1% of users have installed DoNotTrackMe,
5% use AdBlock, and 11.5% use AdBlockPlus. Moreover, more than 84.5% of users
do not run any extension to limit advertisement or prevent connections to online track-
ers. On the other hand, we measure the pervasiveness of most popular online trackers.
We build a list of more than 440 tracking services using Ghostery database. We look
for users that contact them, i.e., which establish TCP connections toward tracker host-
names. The results illustrated in Fig. 5 are impressive: 98.8%, 98.7% and 97.4% of
users regularly (and unintentionally) contact top third party tracking services, i.e., Dou-
bleClick, Google Analytics, and Google Syndication. We count 120 third party services
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that are contacted by more than 50% of population. Similarly, 96.6% and 92.4% of
users contact Facebook and Twitter (and the tracking services they include) on a daily
basis, often involuntarily via the social network buttons embedded on other web pages.
These facts clearly testify how pervasive are tracking services in today Internet, and
how users are unaware of their presence.
4.2 Checking HTTPS Information Handling
We run a second experiment to verify which data is sent over HTTPS when entering per-
sonal information such as user credentials and credit card data on legitimate websites.
We collect a dataset by browsing a catalog of websites with a CROWDSURF enabled
browser which logs all HTTP and HTTPS requests it observes. We consider a list made
of the Alexa top site in the Global, Banking, Gambling and Shopping categories. We
investigate a total of 160 top sites. For each website, we manually attempt to log in
with the dummy credentials “MyName:MyPassword”. Then, from the collected logs,
we check how the client sends those credentials to the servers.
We find that still 10% among the most popular websites in the global rank do not
use HTTPS to exchange users’ credentials. Only 2 of these apply some custom encryp-
tion/obfuscation technique before transmitting them to the server. Even more surpris-
ingly, among the websites embracing HTTPS in the Global category, we notice that
users’ credentials are always sent in plain text over the encrypted channel. Assuming
HTTPS offers a secure channel, no guarantees are given on how the server handles and
stores credentials. Indeed, the server could store those in plain text, posing severe se-
curity risks if the server gets compromised. Unfortunately, this is not a rare event. The
most recent incident involved a giant like eBay [4]. Even for the Bank category, 75%
of websites transmit credentials in plain text, totally trusting the HTTPS channel. Inter-
esting, some of those do implement two-step strong authentication methods based on
pins or tokens, sent in plain text through the HTTPS channel. Similarly, 90% of both
Gambling and Shopping categories do not hash the credentials.
These findings strengthen the need for CROWDSURF to warn users about the weak-
nesses that are unfortunately present on (popular) websites they are used to log in.
5 Automatic Detection of Tracker: a Simple Algorithm
One of the design challenges of CROWDSURF is the need of automatic means to detect
services that possibly offend users’ privacy. This section presents a simple prelimi-
nary solution to automate advice generation. Specifically, we present an unsupervised
methodology for an automatic data analyzer to identify possible third party trackers that
users unknowingly contact while browsing a given website.
We consider the set of HTTP requests that a user generates when visiting a target
website. The CROWDSURF layer running in user’s device monitors the HTTP traffic
and sends to the collector the anonymized user identifier, and a sample of HTTP request
logs having i) the hostname different from target, and ii) target appearing in the referer
field. In other words, CROWDSURF reports to the collector all the third party URLs a
user contacts when accessing the webpage target. Given this input, the data analyzer
looks for parameters in the URLs that may suggest the third party service is using some
identifier to track the users.
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Algorithm 1 Automatic third party tracker identifier.
Input: HS, W # HTTP request log and target website
Output: TS # List of possible third party trackers and their user-tracking keys
1: Hipa ← init hash table() # Init hashtable of IP addresses
2: Hk−v ← init hash table() # Init hashtable of key-value pairs
3: while h in HS do # Read HTTP request logs
4: h← ipa, hostname, path, referer # Extract fields of interest
5: if W not in h.hostname and W in h.referer then # Check target is third party
6: K, V ← extract keys(h.path) # Extract keys and values from the path field
7: while k, v in K, V do # Iterate all key names and values
8: hostname key ipa← create hash(h.hostname, k, h.ipa) # Create hash for Hipa
9: hostname key value← create hash(h.hostname, k, v) # Create hash for Hk−v
10: ADD DISTINCT(Hipa [hostname key ipa], v) # Insert all key-value pairs in Hipa
11: ADD DISTINCT(Hk−v [hostname key value], h.ipa) # Insert the IP address in Hk−v
12: end while
13: end if
14: end while
15: while hash in Hipa do # Iterate over Hipa
16: while value in Hipa[hash] do # Iterate over values mapped to current hash
17: if LEN(Hipa [hash]) == 1 then # Check current hash refers to one value only
18: hostname, key, ipa← decode hash(hash) # Decode hash into hostname, key and IP address
19: hashaux ← create hash(hostname, key, value) # Create an auxiliary hash using hostname, key and
value
20: if LEN(Hk−v [hashaux]) == 1 and Hk−v [hashaux] == ipa then # Check the auxiliary hash in
Hk−v contains only one IP address and check this corresponds to the one in Hipa
21: ADD(TS, hostname, key) # Add hostname and key to the output list
22: end if
23: end if
24: end while
25: end while
Our algorithm, illustrated in Alg. 1, extracts all HTTP parameters from the third
party URLs. For example, from the third party URL http://www.acme.com/query?key1=X&key2=Y,
it extracts key1 and key2, with values X and Y, respectively; www.acme.com is the third
party hostname. For each hostname and for each key, we investigate one-to-one map-
ping between the CROWDSURF user identifier and the observed values. Intuitively, we
look for keys whose value is uniquely associated to the user. This hints to the key being
a “user identifier”, and thus the algorithm labels the third party hostname as “tracker”.
We validate our approach using our passive traffic trace, which contains enough
data to pinpoint trackers. We target three popular web portals, News1, YouTube, and
Facebook. We check all third party hostnames, and we extract those keys whose values
show a one-to-one mapping with the IP addresses of the client which is considered an
user identifier in our traces.10 In this experiment, we consider those keys for which we
observe at least 25 distinct IP addresses.
Thus, we run the algorithm to pinpoint the possible third party trackers, and the
keys they employ to store the users’ identifiers. Results are reported in Table 2. As
shown, we identify 3, 5 and 8 trackers for News1, YouTube and Facebook, respectively.
Keys clearly suggest the exchange of possible user identifiers. The only possible false
positive is install timestamp, which however we verify manually to be a unique user
identifier. Looking at the hostnames, most of them are known tracking services that
10 The ISP assigns a static IP address to each household modem.
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Website Third party hostname Keys
News1
pix04.revsci.net id
su.addthis.com puid
track.adform.net icid
YouTube
bh.ams.contextweb.com vgd
eu-jet-01.sociomantic.com fpc
ib.adnxs.com uuid
uip.semasio.net sExtCookieId
www.wajam.com install timestamp
Facebook
adadvisor.net bk uuid
data.bncnt.com uid
go.flx1.com anuid, euid
ira.spysomeone.com s
tags.bluekai.com google gid
ww1.collserve.com bk uuid
www.skyscanner.com ksh id
Table 2: The third party trackers and the user-tracking keys we find in our HTTP trace
for the targets News1, YouTube and Facebook.
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Fig. 6: Popularity of hostnames found in a portion of our trace, and corresponding av-
erage time Tc (in hours) to collect at least 100 with a sample ratio equal to 1/10.
already appear in our list. The only exception is www.skyscanner.com (a flight booking
website) which tracks the users using the key ksh id.
Results are promising and show that the availability of large data enables automatic
detection of personal leakage information. While the our experiments are carried over
HTTP traffic, CROWDSURF allows us to check for privacy leakage also on HTTPS
connection, by checking other key-value pair, e.g., in cookies.
6 A Feasibility Check
As described in Sec. 2, the crowd feedback is vital for CROWDSURF. Therefore, we
study how long the system should take to build a large enough data collection to get
reliable analysis results to generate the advices. We consider for instance the case in
which we aim at collecting data involving N different hostnames. We say a hostname
data to be reliable when we have collected at least K entries, and we assume that an en-
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try is reported to the collector when a user visits such hostname. We apply the sampling
so that only a fraction of entries are eventually seen by CROWDSURF.
Understanding how many visits we need to obtain K samples for each of the N
hostnames is a problem that belongs to Coupon Collector’s family. In particular, we
have to refer to the Newman-Shepp generalization [12]. In this case, the expectation
E[V ] of the number of visits V needed to collect a constant number of entries K for a
large number of hostnames N is given by:
E[V ] = N logN + (K − 1)N log logN +O(N). (1)
The model assumes visits are equally distributed among N hostnames. Considering
the trace described in Sec. 4 where 19, 000 households contacts every day more than
290, 000 distinct hostnames. By combining this data with Eq. 1, we obtain that the sys-
tem would take only 8 days to collect at least K=100 reports for each of the N=10, 000
selected hostnames in the catalogue.
In reality, the probability of visiting an hostnames typically follows a heavy-tailed
Zipf-like distribution. For instance, on the left y-axis, Fig. 6 reports the number of vis-
its of top 10, 000 hostnames. As expected, it follows the typical Zipf-like distribution.
Thanks to this, the top 10, 000 hostnames correspond to 88.13% of total visits. There-
fore, we run a trace-driven experiment using the actual trace to evaluate the average time
Tc needed to collect 100 samples for each of the top 10, 000 hostnames in the trace. We
assume CROWDSURF clients are configured with sampling ratio equal to 1/10. We fo-
cus on the top 10, 000 popular hostnames in the first day of our trace. For each request,
we measure Tc, averaging over 12 independent runs, i.e., starting the collection at a
random time. As soon as K=100 samples are collected, the hostname advice is said to
be reliable.
The right y-axis of Fig. 6 reports Tc (in hours) needed to reach the minimum critical
mass of K=100 visits. As shown, CROWDSURF would take few seconds to collect 100
visits for the most popular hostname (e.g., 87 s for www.google.com). Less that 48 h are
needed in the worst case. Observe that some services show very bursty traffic patterns
that considerably decrease Tc. Indeed, when the clients access those services, we collect
a large number of samples in few time. The overall average value of Tc is 12.57 h, much
less than the time predicted by Eq. 1.
This simple experiment clearly shows that even with a population of only 19, 000
contributors that are reporting 1/10 of their activity we can easily collect enough data to
compute advices. We can also envision smarter sampling policies to, e.g., avoid to keep
collecting samples from most popular sites while only asking sample contributions for
other services.
7 Discussion and Future Work
This paper presented CROWDSURF, a novel crowd-sourced holistic approach to em-
power informed choices in the web. Motivated by the fact that today service owners
have the (almost total) control on information they can collect, and by the fact that
users and companies are more and more kept out of the loop, we advocate the need
for any user, any device, any network to have the freedom to control the information
exchanged on the Internet.
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In this paper, we have shown that CROWDSURF is feasible. We presented real data to
show how easy would be building a crowd-sourced knowledge, supported by automatic
algorithms. As a proof of concept, we implemented CROWDSURF as a Firefox plugin,
showing that its benefits can come at a marginal performance cost for the user.
CROWDSURF design presents some practical challenges that must be faced, and
ingenuity must be used to find appropriate solutions. The research community as a
whole is called to design efficient algorithms, and propose scalable implementations.
CROWDSURF offers this possibility, allowing anyone to contribute.
We are aware that our idea is ambitious, as, first, CROWDSURF shall pass through a
long and difficult standardization process to get accepted as a compelling technology by
the industry, and, second, it shall undergo a deep engineering analysis to convince users
about its effectiveness and usability. However, as the community is becoming more and
more aware that data constitutes a vital asset in modern web, we are confident that the
unified solution offered by CROWDSURF represents a good starting point to protect (and
possibly endorse) such asset.
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